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Liquidity Effects on Travel and Tourism Stocks following Global Financial Crises
Andros Gregoriou
Brighton Business School, University of Brighton, Brighton, England

Sotiroula Liasidou
Department of Hotel and Tourism Management, Cyprus University of Technology, Limassol, Cyprus

ABSTRACT

This paper explores liquidity effects following the global financial crises between 2007 and 2009 for
25 stocks listed on the Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index. We find evidence of a sustained increase
in the liquidity of the stocks as a result of the financial crises. The empirical findings are consistent
with the information cost/liquidity hypothesis, which states that investors demand a lower premium
for holding stocks with relatively more available information. Our results suggest that the travel and
tourism industry is no longer considered a luxury item. On the contrary, it appears to be more of
a necessity to stimulate business and happiness for firms and individuals, respectively, in times of
financial turmoil.
Key words: Liquidity, Financial Crises, Travel and Tourism, Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index

1.0 Introduction
The global financial crises (2007–2009), referred to
by the media as the credit crunch, is a major cause of
the current recession the world is facing. In a time of
recession, we would expect the tourism industry to
suffer significantly. When money is tight, business
and leisure travel are dramatically reduced for all
consumers because of company profits and individuals’ disposable income falling to considerably low
levels. However, according to the United Nations
World Tourism Organization, the key trends in
2010 appear to contradict the traditional view that
tourism falls during times of financial crises. This
is due to the fact that international tourism arrivals increased by 6.6% from 2009–2010. In addition,
tourism receipts reached $919 billion worldwide in
2010, up from $851 billion in 2009.
An additional aftermath of the financial crisis on
tourism, apart from the increase in tourism arrivals, was a change in traveling behavior, perceptions,
and attitudes of the travelers with the need of different tourism products (Alegre & Pou, 2016; Bronner

& Hoog, 2016; De Vita & Kyaw, 2016). The direct
response of the destinations was to develop the pertinent products in the “form” of multifaceted activities with dynamic experiences as required by the
various market segments (Lopes, Abrantes, & Kastenholz, 2014).
Given the contradiction between conventional
financial theory and the evidence provided by the
United Nations World Tourism Organization stated
above and in more detail in Section 2 of this article, along with the lack of empirical literature in this
very important issue, we feel that a comprehensive
analysis of the tourism industry around the financial
crises period is a vital piece of research that should
be undertaken. We have attempted to bridge this gap
in the literature by examining the market liquidity
effects of the Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index
before and after the financial crises.
Our findings show a significant increase in
the liquidity of the travel and tourism stocks after
the financial crises. In addition, we show that the
increase in liquidity is maintained over three-
month post-financial crises trading. Therefore, as
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the increase in liquidity spans over a three-month
period, we can say that there is a long-term improvement in the liquidity of the travel and tourism firms
after the financial crises.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the
following way. The next section provides a review of
the previous literature concerning travel and tourism during periods of financial turbulence. Section
3 describes the data and the methodology. Section
4 presents the analysis of both the short-term and
long-term effects of trading before and after the
financial crises for travel and tourism index stocks.
Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2.0 Literature review
2.1 Tourism in economic turbulence

As a result of the global financial crises, demand
changed for various products and services in the
travel and tourism industry (see Papatheodorou &
Pappas, 2017; Smeral, 2010). The economic recession, especially in the United States and Europe,
had a significant impact on tourism industry consumption habits because of lower income and high
rates of unemployment (De Vita & Kyaw, 2016).
The immediate aftermath was that traveling habits
became more short-haul, intra-regional and domestic (World Tourism Organization and International
Labour Organization, 2013; Sheel, 2008). The interrelation of economic down turn and the impact
on tourism was the discussion in a vast number of
research papers (see among others, Alegre & Pou,
2016; De Vita & Kyaw, 2016; Bronner & Hoog, 2016;
Alegre, Mateo, & Pou, 2013; Culiuc, 2014; Papatheodorou, Rosselló, & Xiao, 2010; Ritchie, Amaya
Molinar, & Frechtling, 2010). The financial crisis
creates opportunities for research especially on the
behavior of consumers as a result of the new financial regulations that have been put in place (Sheldon
& Dwyer, 2010).
Additionally, companies must readjust their strategies to accommodate both their and the consumers’ requirements according to the new economic
situation (Bronner & Hoog, 2016). Bernini and
Cracolici (2016) find that tourism as a consumption
good varies in terms of the way it can be acquired
and experienced. At the same time, tourism suppliers produce products that offer what is primarily
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needed by the various consumer groups (Liasidou,
2013). Undoubtedly, tourism is becoming an activity
to the majority of the people in advanced economies
basically because of the plethora of opportunities
in the tourism marketplace. Nowadays, holidays
can be easily booked online (Ukpadi & Karjaluoto,
2017) and at the same time there is a choice of various transportation modes with the most notable
example to be the appearance of the Low Cost Carriers (Liasidou, 2017; Alderighi, Cento, Nijkamp, &
Rietveld, 2012). Additionally, there is a variety of
choices in the accommodation sector at any price
range and service quality (Xiang, Magnini, & Fesenmaier, 2015).
Historically, tourism was referred to as the Grand
Tour and was the privilege of the members of aristocracy. The boom of the tourism industry happened
after the end of the Second World War with the phenomenon of mass tourism. Thus, tourism became
an activity affordable to most people in Europe and
the United States. The emerging economies, namely
the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South
Africa), contribute to the tourism industry both in
supply and demand, with travelers seeking authenticity through tourism activities that create memorable experiences. Bernini and Cracolici (2016) find
that tourism as a consumption good varies in terms
of the way it can be acquired and experienced. At
the same time, tourism suppliers produce products
that offer what is primarily needed by the various
consumer groups (Liasidou, 2013). The next part
considers the methods of the study.
3.0 Methods
3.1 Data

We analyze the 25 companies listed on the Dow
Jones Travel and Tourism Index before and after the
financial crises. The 25 companies in our data sample are shown in Table 1. We only analyze 25 companies because they are the largest travel and tourism
companies in the world that dominate the industry,
reflected by their inclusion in the Dow Jones Travel
and Tourism Index. The financial crisis consists of
186 event days (30% of working days) between January 1, 2007, and April 30, 2009. Therefore, in our
event study the pre- (post-)financial crises date is
before (after) January 1, 2007 (April 30, 2009). Our
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final dataset consists of companies that satisfied the
following criteria:
a) The company is not involved in a merger that
immediately preceded the event date.
b) The company has available historical data on
the Dow Jones for a period of 90 days before
and after the event date.
c) The common stock of a company does not
exhibit a split in the period of 90 days before
and after the event date.
Criteria A–C are applied to minimize the impact
of alternative events that may occur during the same
time period. Once the criteria are applied, we yield a
sample of all the 25 companies. For these companies,
daily stock returns, daily trading volume and shares
outstanding are obtained from the Dow Jones. Like
previous market microstructure studies (see among
others, Hegde & McDermott, 2003; Gregoriou &
Ioannidis, 2006) we obtain the number of analysts
that follow the stocks from the Institutional Brokers’
Estimates System International (I/B/E/S) database.
For robustness, we implement two alternative
measures of liquidity costs, the relative and effective
Table 1.

List of the Companies in Our Data Sample

Number

Company name

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Expedia
Travelocity
Price Line Group
American Express Travel
Carlson Wagonlit Travel
HRG North America
AAA Travel
BCD Travel
Corporate Travel Management
Travel and Transport
Altour
Direct Travel
World Travel Incorporation
Omega World Travel
JTB Americas Group
World Travel Holding
ATG Travel
Vision Travel Solutions
Adelman Travel Group
Travizon
Worldview Travel
cheapcarribbean.com
Fox World Travel
Shorts Travel Management
Travel Planners International

uma-jhfm272.indd 100

bid-ask spread. The relative spread is defined as the
ask price minus the bid price, divided by the midprice (the average of the bid and ask prices). As Lee
and Ready (1991) point out, the problem with the
relative spread is that it can be regarded as an inaccurate measure of liquidity because many trades occur
at prices within the bid and ask price. Therefore, in
order to obtain a more accurate measure of the market liquidity, we follow the methodology in Heflin
and Shaw (2000) and Hegde and McDermott (2003)
and compute the effective bid-ask spread. The effective bid-ask spread is computed as twice the absolute
value of the difference between the transaction price
and the midprice in effect at the time of the trade.
We begin our empirical estimates with the use of an
event study surrounding the two event days concerning the pre- and post-financial crises trading of the 25
companies listed on the Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index. We define the event (i.e., day 0) as January
1, 2007, and April 30, 2009 for the pre- and postfinancial crises trading period. We use the traditional
market model which was first established by Brown
and Warner (1985) and was subsequently used by
most previous research on event studies (Hegde &
McDermott, 2003; Denis, McConnell, Ovtchinnikov,
& Yu, 2003; Gregoriou & Ioannidis, 2006).
The market model involves a procedure with a
value-
weighted market index and market model
parameters estimated over the time period 90 days
before and after the event date in order to calculate
excess returns around the event dates for each security. The excess returns obtained from the market
model are aggregated through event time to obtain
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). We then aggregate the CARs across securities in order to compute
the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR).
One potential shortcoming of the market model
is that the ACAR is computed assuming independent estimates for each firm. However, as Masse,
Hanrahan, Kushner, and Martinello (2000) point
out this method is problematic when the events
are clustered, as they are in our study. The problem occurs because all 25 firms are exposed to the
financial crises the same time period. This means
that the abnormal returns calculated for each firm
are unlikely to be independent. Instead there will be
contemporaneous correlation of the returns across
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firms, resulting in t-statistics on average abnormal
returns being biased away from zero (Brown & Warner, 1985). Beneish (1991) and Cable and Holland
(2000) suggest that a solution to such a problem is
to construct an equally weighted portfolio of the 25
firms in our sample and to assess the average abnormal performance at the portfolio level.
The portfolio does not suffer from contemporaneous correlation, which implies that we can use the
central limit theorem to derive its sampling distribution and obtain reliable t-statistics for our study
(Campbell, Lo, & MacKinlay, 1997). We compute
the ACARs at both the individual firm level and the
portfolio level. The results are quantitatively similar,
so we only report the individual firm results.
4.0 Empirical results
4.1 Abnormal returns of tourism industry after the
financial crises

In order to investigate the impact of short-term
effects of the financial crises on the Dow Jones
Travel and Tourism Index firms, we compute abnormal returns and changes in liquidity around a five-
day event window, [−5, +5]. We utilize the standard
event methodology outlined in the previous section
of the paper for each stock in our sample for each
event day. The results for the event window [−5, +5]
are presented in Panel A of Table 2.
Panel A indicates that stock returns of the Dow
Jones Travel and Tourism Index firms are affected by
the financial crises. Significant positive AARs (Average Abnormal Returns) persist over the 11-day event
window, with the largest average return of 0.88%
occurring on the first date after the financial crises
(event day 1). The CAR from day −5 to +5 of 5.04%
is distinguishable from zero with a t-statistic of 2.50.
The short-term abnormal returns results suggest
that positive excess returns are gained by investors
on the Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index due to
the financial crises.
If the financial crisis has improved the sustained
liquidity of travel and tourism stocks, then we would
expect the abnormal returns witnessed in Panel A
of Table 1 to persist over time. In order to test this
hypothesis, we compute the CAR of Dow Jones
Travel and Tourism stocks over a three-month event
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Table 2. Abnormal Returns around Dow Jones Travel and
Tourism Index Financial Crises Trading
The sample consists of 25 Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index
firms that were available to be traded before and after the financial
crises. Average Abnormal returns (AAR) are computed using the
market model and the standard event study methodology. The
estimation window for computing the market model parameters
is the event time interval [−90, 90]. AAR is tested for significance
using a t-statistic.

Panel A. Short-term abnormal returns
Event Day
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5
[−5, +5]

AAR (%)

t-test H0: AAR=0

0.14
0.31
0.36
0.62
0.86
0.42
0.88
0.64
0.39
0.30
0.12
5.04

2.30**
2.25**
2.18**
2.65**
2.63**
3.24**
3.01**
2.67**
2.20**
2.16**
2.09**
2.50**

Panel B. Long-term abnormal returns
Event Day
[0, +10]
[0, +20]
[0, +30]
[0, +60]
[0, +90]

AAR (%)

t-test H0: AAR=0

0.72
0.65
0.55
0.43
0.31

2.22**
2.13**
2.21**
2.13**
2.16**

** Significant at 5% level.

window [0, +90] after the financial crises period.
The results are presented in Panel B of Table 2. We
observe that there are significant CARs for up to 90
trading days following the financial crises. Therefore,
from the results in Table 2 we can report evidence of
permanent stock price increases in Dow Jones Travel
and Tourism stocks after the financial crises.
4.2 Trading volume effects of financial crises on
the tourism industry

To determine the possible presence of liquidity
effects, we proceed with the analysis of the impact
of the financial crises on the trading volume of the
Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index. We test for the
presence of abnormal trading volume in the event
period by employing the following dummy variable
panel fixed effects regression model.
+5

Volumejt = αj + γt +

∑ D β + ε for j = 1,25 and t = –90,+5
–5

i i

j

(1)
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Where Volumejt is the logarithm of trading volume
for stock j at day t. αj captures the variation in trading volume across all the companies in our sample.
γt captures the changes in trading volume per day
that is common across all the companies in our sample. Di are dummy variables for each trading day in
the event window [−5, +5]. The coefficients of the
eleven dummy variables, βi capture the abnormal
trading volume over the event window, [−5, +5]. εj is
a random disturbance term with a mean of zero and
a variance of σ2, αj , γt , and βi are parameters to be
estimated. Equation 1 is estimated by a fixed effects
panel estimator using the White (1980) heteroscedastic consistent covariance matrix. The results of
Equation 1 can be seen in Panel A of Table 3.
The positive and significant sign of the 11 dummy
variables confirms that there is a dramatic increase
in trading volume in the tourism industry after
the financial crises. For example, five days before
the event (i.e., event day −5) the coefficient on the
dummy β–5 is 0.346 and significant with a t-statistic
of 2.93. The abnormal volume continues to increase
and reaches its peak on the day of the event (i.e.,
event day 0). On this event day β0 is 0.91 and highly
significant with a t-statistic of 3.76, indicating that
trading volume has substantially risen for the travel
and tourism industry after the financial crises.
Following the financial crises, the abnormal volume decreases from its peak but continues to be
positive and significant throughout the post-event
period. The regression in Equation 1 also passes the
normality test, suggesting that the abnormal volume
empirical estimates are not due to possible outliers
in the data. In addition, αj is significant showing that
there are changes in trading volume across the 25
Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index firms in our
sample.
In order to analyze changes in the long-term trading volume of Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index
stocks preceding the financial crises, we construct
a Post/Pre ratio of standardized trading volume
in the post-crises period [0, +90] to the standardized volume in the pre-crises period [0, −90]. The
results of the long-term changes in trading volume
are reported in Panel B of Table 3. We can see that
the mean (median) Post/Pre ratio of standardized
trading volume is 2.28 (2.21) with a corresponding
t-statistic of 4.63. This finding suggests that after the
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Table 3. Trading Volume around Dow Jones Travel and
Tourism Index Financial Crises Trading
Panel A. Short-term abnormal trading volume
The following panel fixed effects regression model is estimated to
investigate the changes in trading volume surrounding the dates
of the financial crises on 25 firms listed on the Dow Jones Travel
and Tourism Index.
+5

Volumejt = αj + γt +

∑ D β + ε for j = 1,25 and t = –90,+5
–5

i i

j

Where Volumejt is the logarithm of trading volume for stock j at
day t. αj captures the variation in trading volume across all the
companies in our sample. γt captures the changes in trading
volume per day that is common across all the companies in our
sample. Di are dummy variables for each trading day in the event
window [−5, +5]. The coefficients of the eleven dummy variables,
βi capture the abnormal trading volume over the event window,
[−5, +5]. εj is a random disturbance term with a mean of zero and a
variance of σ2, αj , γt , and βi are parameters to be estimated. NORM
(2) is the p-value for the Jarque-Bera normality test.
Parameter
αj
γt
β–5
β–4
β–3
β–2
β–1
β0
β+1
β+2
β+3
β+4
β+5
Adjusted R2 = 0.65
NORM (2) = 0.47

Estimate

t-statistic

0.125
0.0034
0.346
0.476
0.584
0.672
0.836
0.91
0.84
0.632
0.532
0.493
0.282

2.63**
2.23**
2.93**
2.83**
2.26**
2.23**
2.92**
3.76**
2.32**
2.82**
2.76**
2.01**
2.90**

** Significant at the 5% level.

Panel B. Long-term trading impact of trading volume on
Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index financial crises trading
The sample consists of 25 Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index
firms that were traded before and after the financial crises.
Standardized trading volume is defined as daily trading volume
in shares divided by the total Dow Jones trading for the same day.
Standardized trading volumes are computed for the pre-financial
crises period [0, −90] and the post-financial crises period [0, +90].
The t-statistic is constructed to test the null hypothesis that the
standardized trading volume is unchanged in the pre-financial
crises period as compared with the post-financial crises period.
Variable
Mean (Pre-internet)
Mean (Post-internet)
Median (Pre-internet)
Median (Post-internet)
Mean (Post/Pre Ratio)
Median (Pre/Post Ratio)
t-test

Standardized trading volume
0.00657%
0.0150%
0.00652%
0.0144%
2.28
2.21
4.63**

** Significant at 5% level.
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global financial crisis there has been a permanent
rise in trading volume of the Dow Jones Travel and
Tourism Index.
In the preceding section of the paper we attempt
to explain the increase in the stock prices and the
significant increase in aggregate trading volume
of Dow Jones Travel and Tourism stocks, after the
global financial crises, with the use of the information cost/liquidity hypothesis.
4.3 Information cost liquidity hypothesis

The information hypothesis was first established
by Van Horne (1970) in the context of new listings
on the NYSE, stating that listing signals good news
about firms’ future prospects. Since the work by Van
Horne (1970), researchers such as Schleifer (1986),
Dhillon and Johnson (1991), Beneish and Gardner
(1995), Hegde and McDermott (2003) and Gregoriou and Ioannidis (2006) have examined whether
information about the investment appeal of a stock is
provided by news of listing changes. They all report
significant improvement in stock performance after
inclusion in the index.
From the previous section, we discovered that
there was an increase in trading volume when the
25 Dow Jones Travel and Tourism firms were traded
after the financial crises. As a result of the increase
in trading volume, Dow Jones Travel and Tourism
Index companies may receive more attention by
analysts and investors, resulting in lower bid-ask
spreads and higher market liquidity.
If after the financial crises, travel and tourism companies are followed by increased scrutiny by analysts
and investors, the firms’ information environment
is richer and the trading will be more frequent,
resulting in increased liquidity. In this section of the
paper, we analyze whether there are changes in the
information environments and the liquidity of the
Dow Jones Travel and Tourism firms after the financial crises.
If changes in the Dow Jones Travel and Tourism
Index before and after the financial crises are associated with changes in the information environment,
the stock prices of the Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index firms adjust to reflect changes in future
levels of available information.
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In order to evaluate changes in the information
environment of the Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index stocks before and after the financial crises, we analyze the analysts’ coverage of the stocks
in the pre-crises and post-crises period. To analyze
the long-term changes in the information environment of the stocks following the financial crises, we
construct a “Post/Pre ratio” of the number of analysts that follow each stock in the post-crises period
[0, +90] to the number of analysts that follow the
stock in the pre-crises period [0, −90]. The results
of the analysts’ coverage of the stocks are portrayed
in Table 4.
From Table 3, we can see that the mean (median)
Post/Pre ratio for the analysts’ coverage of Dow Jones
Travel and Tourism Index stocks is 2.65 (2.99). The
change is highly significant with a t-statistic of 3.70.
The results suggest that there is a significantly richer
information environment for Dow Jones Travel and
Tourism Index stocks once they are traded online.
Given that Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index
firms operate in a richer information environment
after the financial crises, we proceed by analyzing
whether the increased information environment of
the stocks results in increased market liquidity in
the manner predicted by Schleifer (1986), Dhillon
and Johnson (1991), Beneish and Gardner (1995)
and Gregoriou and Ioannidis (2006).
In order to analyze the impact of the financial crises on the short-term liquidity of Dow Jones Travel
Table 4. Long-Term Impact on Analyst Coverage of Dow
Jones Travel and Tourism Index Stocks Pre-and Post-
Financial Crises Trading
The sample consists of 25 Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index
firms that were traded before and after the financial crises. The
number of analysts following the stock is the number of earning
estimates as reported in the I/B/E/S summary data file. The number
of analysts is computed for each stock for the pre-financial crises
period [0, −90] and the post-financial crises period [0, +90]. The
t-statistic is constructed to test the null hypothesis that the number
of analysts following each stock is unchanged in the pre-financial
crises period as compared with the post-financial crises period.
Variable
Mean (Pre-internet)
Mean (Post-internet)
Median (Pre-internet)
Median (Post-internet)
Mean (Post/Pre Ratio)
Median (Pre/Post Ratio)
t-test

Analyst coverage
1.2
3.2
1
3
2.65
2.99
3.70**

** Significant at 5% level.

11/20/19 5:09 PM

104

A. Gregoriou & S. Liasidou

and Tourism Index stocks, we construct ratios of the
daily average quoted, and relative and effective bid-
ask spreads over various time interval event windows in the pre- and post-financial crises period.
The quoted bid-ask spread is constructed because
this measure of spread encapsulates the economic
significance of the spread to the market-
maker
(Branch & Freed, 1977). The relative bid-ask spread
is computed as the ask price minus the bid price
divided by the midprice. However, as pointed out by
Lee and Ready (1991), the relative bid-ask spread has
two potential shortcomings. First, it overstates the
trading costs of a stock because it fails to account for
the tendency of prices to rise following a purchase
and fall following a sale. Second, it can be argued
that the relative bid-ask spread is an inappropriate
measure of stock liquidity due to the fact that trades
frequently occur within the ask and bid prices.
In our dataset, for instance, approximately 30% of
trades occur within the midprice. Therefore, in order
to account for these two shortcomings, we also compute the effective bid-ask spread, defined at twice the
absolute value of the difference between trade price
and the prevailing midprice. There is, however, a

potential problem with the use of either the relative
or the effective bid-ask spread. The problem is that
both measures of bid-ask spread will automatically
increase, due to the increase in the midprice after the
financial crises, witnessed in Table 1. Therefore, for
completeness we also compute the quoted bid-ask
spread defined as the ask price minus the bid price,
before and after the financial crises trading period of
Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index stocks.
In order to provide a comparison of the liquidity of Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index stocks
before and after the financial crises, we construct
ratios of daily relative, effective and quoted bid-ask
spreads over various event time intervals to their
equivalents in the pre-crises period over trading
days [0, −90]. The results of the changes in liquidity of Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index stocks
pre- and post-financial crises trading can be seen
in Table 5. There is clear evidence from Table 4 that
spreads are significantly reduced after the financial
crises. For example, in the [−5, +5] event window,
the mean and median quoted bid-ask spread ratios
are 0.84 and highly significant. This indicates that
spreads are significantly reduced over the 11-day

Table 5. Short-and Long-Term Effects of Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index Financial Crises Trading on Stock
Market Liquidity

Stock market liquidity is measured by the quoted, relative, and effective bid-ask spreads of 25 Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index firms
after the financial crises. Quoted bid-ask spread is defined as the ask price minus the bid price. Relative bid-ask spread is defined as the ask
price minus the bid price divided by the quoted midprice. Effective bid-ask spread is defined as is defined as twice the absolute value of the
difference between the transaction price and the midprice in effect at the time of the trade. All spread ratios are computed as the ratio of
the average bid-ask spread of each individual stock over the indicated event time period to the average bid-ask spread measure over the
pre-financial crises trading period of Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index stocks [0, −90]. The null hypothesis that the mean of the reported
ratio is equal to one is tested using a standard t-statistic.
Event time interval
[0, 0]
t-test
[−1, +1]
t-test
[−2, +2]
t-test
[−3, +3]
t-test
[−4, +4]
t-test
[−5, +5]
t-test
[0, +10]
t-test
[0, +30]
t-test
[0, +60]
t-test
[0, +90]
t-test

Quoted spread (%), mean (median)
0.85 (0.86)
−4.15**
0.84 (0.84)
−4.01**
0.85 (0.86)
−4.31**
0.86 (0.86)
−3.87**
0.85 (0.86)
−4.13**
0.84 (0.84)
−3.90**
0.88 (0.87)
−3.84**
0.89 (0.88)
−3.76**
0.93 (0.92)
−2.31**
0.96 (0.95)
−2.06**

Relative spread (%), mean (median)
0.81 (0.80)
−4.23**
0.82 (0.81)
−4.04**
0.81 (0.80)
−4.29**
0.82 (0.81)
−3.99**
0.81 (0.81)
−4.09**
0.82 (0.81)
−3.92**
0.84 (0.84)
−3.82**
0.86 (0.85)
−3.70**
0.90 (0.89)
−2.22**
0.94 (0.93)
−2.02**

Effective spread (%), mean (median)
0.82 (0.81)
−4.19**
0.83 (0.82)
−3.99**
0.82 (0.81)
−4.25**
0.83 (0.82)
−3.95**
0.82 (0.82)
−4.04**
0.83 (0.83)
−3.87**
0.85 (0.84)
−3.80**
0.87 (0.88)
−3.72**
0.91 (0.90)
−2.24**
0.95 (0.94)
−2.00**

** Significant at 5% level.
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trading period centered on the first day after the
financial crises. The results are robust across all
liquidity measures.
The significant spread reductions over the longer
event time intervals, such as [0, +60] and [0, +90],
indicate that the reduction in trading costs is permanent. This implies that the improvement in liquidity
of the Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index stocks
as a result of the financial crises is permanent.
4.4 Multivariate analysis of long-term changes in
market liquidity

It is possible that the univariate analysis undertaken
thus far in the study is based on factors unrelated
to the impact of the financial crises to the Dow
Jones Travel and Tourism Index. To control for
these external factors and improve the power of the
econometric analysis, we perform multivariate analysis of the bid-ask spread. The multivariate analysis is undertaken in the form of a panel fixed effects
estimator. Gregoriou, Ioannidis, and Skerratt (2005)
report that the bid-ask spread increases with return
volatility and decreases with stock price and trading
volume in the London Stock Exchange. We estimate
the following log-linear fixed effects model where
the regression parameters represent elasticities:
Liquidityjt = αj + β1Dt + β2Volumejt
+ β3(Volumejt ∗ Dt ) + β4Pricejt + β5StDevjt + εjt
for j = 1,2 . . . . . . . . ,25 and t = 1,2.
(2)
Where t=1 corresponds to in the pre-crises trading of Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index stocks,
[0, −90], and t=2 corresponds to the post-crises
trading period [0, +90]. The dependent variable
Liquidityjt corresponds to either the quoted, relative,
or effective bid-ask spread for stock j at time period
t. Volume, Price, and StDev represent the traded volume in shares, closing price, and return volatility
for stock j at time period t. The dummy variable Dt
is equal to 1 in the post-crises time period and is
equal to 0, otherwise. αj captures the time-invariant
unobserved stock-specific fixed effects. The fixed-
effect is accounting for differences in the initial level
of liquidity of each security in our sample. We are
mainly concerned with the change in the dummy
variable β1 and the change in the slope of trading
volume as a result of trading after the financial
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crises, β3. All variables apart from the dummy Dt are
expressed as natural logarithms.
The fixed effects panel estimator, displayed in
Equation 2, can be estimated with the use of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The problem of OLS is
that it does not account for the presence of endogeneity trading volume, stock price, and return volatility. In order to capture endogeneity we use the
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) panel
estimator. The GMM estimator established by Arellano and Bond (1991) uses internal instruments for
each time period to deal with endogeneity.
For Equation 2 if E(eiteiz) = 0 holds for z ≠ t across
all the securities then it represents the following
moment conditions:
E(yi,t − z∆eit) = 0 for z ≥ 1; t = 1,2.
If the explanatory variables in Equation 2 are
weakly exogenous, then we also have the following
additional moment conditions:
E(Xi,t − z∆eit) = 0 for z ≥ 1; t = 1,2.
The single equation GMM panel estimator generally specifies a dynamic panel model in first differences and exploits the above moment conditions.
Therefore, the lagged (one time period or more)
levels of endogenous and weakly endogenous variables of the model become appropriate instruments
for addressing endogeneity. The single GMM panel
estimator provides consistent coefficient estimates.
The panel estimation of Equation 2 with the use
of GMM is displayed in Table 6. The first thing to
report is that the panel passes all the relevant diagnostic tests. The fixed effect of the panel is significant with a p-value of zero, suggesting that the
differences in the initial levels of liquidity of the
stocks in our sample are successful captured by
the panel estimator. The test for first order residual
serial correlation is insignificant, suggesting that
the panel does not suffer from autocorrelation. The
residuals of the panel are also normally distributed,
signaling that the results of the panel are not due to
outliers in the data. Finally the results of the Sargan
test confirm the validity of the instruments in the
GMM model.
The R2 indicates that 67% of the variation in
market liquidity is accounted for in the model. The
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variables Price, Volume, and StDev have the predicted
signs and are highly significant. A more important
result is that the parameter β1 is statistically significant whereas, the parameter β3 is insignificant.
The significance of Dt shows that the effective bid-
ask spread decreases on average by 10.15% in the
post-crises period, after controlling for the impact
of trading volume, share prices, and volatility. Volatility has a positive and significant sign that agrees
with the market microstructure literature. Essentially this implies that as market makers are faced
with greater risk they increase their compensation
for providing a financial market for the trade to
occur. Also the coefficient estimates on the trading
volume (Volumejt) is significant. This implies that a
1% increase in mean trading volume (Volumejt) is
associated with a decrease of 8.12% in the average
effective bid-ask spread in the pre-crises period. The
insignificance in the (Volumejt * Dt) interaction term
signals that this increase in trading volume is maintained in the post-crises period.
From our findings we observe that after the financial crises, there was a significant permanent increase
in the trading volume and the stock price liquidity
Table 6.

of Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index stocks. This
finding holds in both a univariate and multivariate
framework, even when the impact of share prices,
trading volume and volatility of the stocks has been
accounted for.
The above analysis reveals that the financial crisis,
even the negative consequences on the economic
and social life, did not severely affect the tourism
industry. Admittedly, households budgets were
restrained, however, there was not a restriction on
tourism spending because people continue going
for holidays (Alegre et al., 2013). The results provide useful insight for the governments, firms, and
employees that in case of an economic turbulence,
the tourism industry remains unaffected.
5.0 Conclusion
The financial crises in the banking sector between
2007–2009 has resulted in a global financial crises on the travel and tourism industry, revealed by
examining the Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index
stocks before and after the financial crises.

A Multivariate Analysis of the Long-Term Impact on Stock Market Liquidity
Liquidityjt = αj + β1Dt + β2Volumejt + β3(Volumejt * Dt) + β4Pricejt + β5StDevjt + εjt
for j = 1,2 . . . . . . . . ,25 and t = 1,2.

Where t=1 corresponds to the pre-financial crises trading of Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index stocks [0, −90], and t=2 corresponds to
the post-financial crises trading period [0, +90]. The dependent variable, Liquidityjt corresponds to either the quoted, relative, or effective
bid-ask spread for stock j at time period t. Quoted bid-ask spread is defined as the ask price minus the bid price. Relative bid-ask spread is
defined as the ask price minus the bid price divided by the quoted midprice. Effective bid-ask spread is defined as twice the absolute value
of the difference between the transaction price and the midprice in effect at the time of the trade. Volume, Price, and StDev represent the
traded volume in shares, closing price, and return volatility for stock j at time period t. The dummy variable Dt is equal to 1 in the post-
financial crises time period and is equal to 0, otherwise. All the variables apart from Dt are expressed as natural logarithms. αj captures the
time-invariant unobserved stock-specific fixed effects. AR(1) is the first order Lagrange Multiplier test performed on the first difference
of the residuals because of the transformations involved. Sargan tests follow a x2 distribution with r degrees of freedom under the null
hypothesis of valid instruments. NORM (2) is the p-value for the Jarque-Bera normality test. The endogenous explanatory variables (all
variables apart from Dt) in the panel are GMM instrumented setting z ≥ 1 [.] are p values and (.) are t-statistics.
Variables
Constant
D
Volume
(Volume*D)
Price
StDev
αj
R2
NORM (2)
AR(1)
Sargan x2 (r)

Quoted bid-ask spread

Relative bid-ask spread

Effective bid-ask spread

−0.886 (−10.23)**
−9.15 (−11.52)**
−7.31 (−8.93)**
0.024 (1.04)
−2.361 (−70.21)**
0.782 (17.23)**
[0.00]
0.571
[0.231]
[0.421]
[0.458]

−0.923 (−11.24)**
−9.63 (−12.98)**
−7.16 (−8.97)**
0.025 (1.05)
−2.357 (−70.23)**
0.791 (18.21)**
[0.00]
0.574
[0.234]
[0.424]
[0.510]

−0.925 (−11.26)**
−10.15 (−13.63)**
−8.12 (−8.94)**
0.026 (1.03)
−2.350 (−70.33)**
0.790 (18.26)**
[0.00]
0.670
[0.237]
[0.427]
[0.513]

** Significant at the 5% level.
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Our empirical findings reveal that there is a long-
term enhancement in liquidity of Dow Jones Travel
and Tourism Index stocks post-financial crises trading that persists over a three-month trading interval. We also find permanent increases in the stock
price and trading volume of Dow Jones Travel and
Tourism Index stocks after the financial crises. Further, we observe a significant increase in analyst
coverage for Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index
shares after the financial crises. This results in significant decreases in bid-ask spreads in the post-crises
period, after controlling for the impact of stock
prices, trading volume, and volatility of returns.
5.1 Managerial implications

The research results add to the existing tourism literature and can be useful to tourism practitioners and
are extremely striking because they go against the
principles of financial theory. In a period of financial
crises, we would expect significant declines in travel
and tourism. This is because the failure of business
and less disposable income for individuals should
result in dramatic decreases for both business and
leisure travelers. In our opinion, our results should
change the perspective in which travel and tourism
should be viewed. It is no longer a luxury item but
more a necessity to stimulate business and happiness for firms and individuals, respectively, in times
of financial turmoil. Given the lack of literature analyzing tourism during the financial crises, we believe
the findings in our paper cannot be ignored.
In particular, destinations should prioritize tourism
as a remedy in case of a financial crisis and to be the
industry of focus for economic recovery. As mentioned above, people even in tight economic conditions are traveling with a plethora of choices suited
to all budgets. The industry has undergone a metamorphosis over the last decades and offered a plethora of products and activities. Additionally, tourism
is considered as a vital and an essential activity and
this should be considered so tourism destinations
and suppliers can be proactive and respond strategically with more products and services for the future
(Alegre & Pou, 2016). Governments should frame
contractive policies and strategies in order to ensure
the economic viability of the tourism industry
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that positively impacts the social life. An important aspect is the focus on quality tourism products
that provide constructive experiences (Lopes et al.,
2014). Quality positively impacts customers’ satisfaction and if they become loyal to destinations and
firms (Kim, 2017).
Finally, the results of the study are insightful to
the firms that invest in the tourism industry. The
investments provide high returns because of current trends with an increased number of travelers.
The permanent rise in liquidity of Dow Jones Travel
and Tourism Index stocks could result in increase in
firm value. This is because it may be less costly for
them to borrow, issue capital, or issue public equity
after the increase in liquidity resulting from online
trading. Extensions that focus on valuation of Dow
Jones Travel and Tourism Index firms after the introduction of online trading are promising avenues for
future research. Also we could compare the impact
of the tourism industry pre and post Brexit.
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